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Islamic banks were minimally affected by the global financial crisis of 2008. This is largely 
attributed to their firm and sound economic principles. This has made Islamic finance a 
feasible alternative system of banking especially in pursuit of financial inclusion.  
Uganda like most third world countries has grappled with the challenge of access to credit 
with a big unbanked population. One of the reasons espoused in this paper for this problem 
has been high cost of credit access caused by prohibitively high interest rates that discourage 
people from attaining loans for their entrepreneurial ventures. Since Islamic banking is an 
interest free based mode of finance, it could have the key to unlocking the door to an 
inclusive economy. 
However, there is a desire for dedicated research and efforts from the authorities to develop 
an effective legal and regulatory framework for Islamic financial industry in Uganda. 
Attempts should be made to modify the existing structure to provide better products and 
quality service within the ambit of Islamic laws. While interest based banking has taken 
hundreds of years to mature to the level where it is today, expecting the same maturity from 
Islamic banking in its nascent stage will be overly ambitious. To develop an economic 
system truly reflective of the sacred principles of Islam, all stakeholders should understand 














1. Research Background 
This Chapter gives an overview of the research, the problem, motivation for the 
study, objectives and accordingly provides background to contextualize the study.  
Before the introduction of Islamic banking, Uganda’s economy has in recent times 
like any other, experienced growths and declines. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
estimates for the fiscal year (FY) 2015/16 indicate that the economy grew by 4.8 per cent, 
which is 0.3 percentage points lower than the growth of 5.1 per cent achieved in the FY 
2014/15.1Although this was a slowdown in the growth of GDP, it is nevertheless a good 
performance given that the global economy faced adverse shocks during 2015/16. In regard 
to public spending, the Government released funds but actual implementation of projects 
remained low as some of the budgeted money went unspent.2 
The incumbent government (National Resistance Movement) in Uganda has since 
1987 embarked on liberalizing the economy through privatization which subsequently led to 
growth in the private sector.3 This sector however needs access to finances, short of which it 
is likely to crumble. The main objective of economic development is not only to boost 
economic growth but also to share prosperity with all segments of society through equitable 
distribution of wealth and income, ergo for a country to attain healthy economic 
development, it must have a sound financial inclusion status.4 
The status of financial inclusion has overtime improved with an overall, 85 per cent 
of the adult population aged 16 years and above being financially included, an improvement 
                                                          
1 Uganda Bureau Of Statistics (UBOS) Statistical Abstract 2016. Available at 
http://www.ubos.org/onlinefiles/uploads/ubos/statistical_abstracts/2016%20Statistical%20Abstract.pdf 
accessed on May 30, 2017. 
2 For example; According to Uganda’s Budget Monitoring and Accountability Unit, a total of two hundred 
forty three billion Ugandan shillings accounting for 24.1 percent of the released budget to the health sector was 
not spent. http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1424773/todays-vision-2016   
3 Augustus Nuwagaba, ‘Globalization and Competitiveness; Implications for poverty reduction in Uganda.’ 
Michigan State University Journal of social development in Africa Vol 16. No 2 2001 at page 37. 
4 Asian Development Bank Institute. Financial System Stability, Regulation, and Financial Inclusion. 




from 70 percent in 2009 and 38 per cent in 2006.5 The improvement in formal inclusion 
between 2009 and 2013 was largely inspired by mobile money services whose accounts now 
stand at 55 per cent.6 The percentage of the banked population though stable, is still low 
ranging between 18-21 per cent while formal inclusion is widespread urban areas compared 
to rural areas.7 This lack of inclusive growth is exacerbated by the appalling rate of 
economic inequality prevailing through the country.8 Access to credit is more difficult to 
attain in rural areas than it is in urban places as banks and other institutions have shied away 
from the former segment of society.9  
The population has mainly shied away from banks because of their increasingly 
strict terms for borrowing caused by worsening quality of loans that had trimmed private 
sector credit by 1.6 per cent by September 2016, compared to the corresponding period of 
2015.10 As at the end of June 2016, commercial bank lending rates averaged 23.54 per cent 
and banks have come under pressure for giving prohibitively high rates to the private 
sector.11Although as of April 2017, the BOU had reduced the Central Bank Rate (CBR) by 
0.5 per cent points to 11 per cent12, this still remains a relatively high figure that will 
consequently force the conventional commercial banks to charge a higher interest rate to the 
public that wishes to obtain credit. There is clearly need for further reduction in interest 
rates charged by the banks and this is where the unconventional-interest-free Islamic 
banking enters the equation. Islamic finance prohibits the charging of ‘riba’ (interest).13 The 
                                                          
5 Bank of Uganda Report on the status of Financial Inclusion 2014. Available at 
https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/bou-downloads/Financial_Inclusion/Report-on-the-State-of-Financial-Inclusion-
First-Edition-March-2014.pdf. Accessed on September 4, 2017. 
6 Uganda Bureau of Statistics op cit (n1). 
7The 2014 Global Findex Report. Available at 
http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/Infographics/WB_GlobalFindex_GlobalInfographic_0406_f
inal.pdf. Accessed on May 29, 2017. 
8Oxfam Uganda Inequality Report, 2017, ‘Who is Growing? Ending Inequality in Uganda’ Report available at 
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/oxfam_in_uganda_inequality_report_com
pressed.pdf  last accessed on May 30, 2017. Oxfam Uganda. 
9 Simon Mutungi Muhairwe, ‘Key challenges faced by government in deepening financial inclusion in 
Uganda’. Uganda Bankers Conference inaugural conference magazine July 2017.   
10Global Findex Report op cit (n 7). 
11Mark Keith Muhumuza, ‘Why Uganda’s interest rates stubbornly remain high’ The Daily Monitor 
Newspaper published on August 9, 2016. 
12 Bank of Uganda Monetary Policy for April 2017.  
13 “Those who charge riba are in the same position as those controlled by the devil’s influence...as for those 




rationale behind the prohibition of riba on consumption loans is to redistribute the 
purchasing power from the rich to the poor.14 This is because it is assumed that those who 
borrow are seeking to maintain some minimum standard of living and as such to make a 
profit off them is against the spirit of charity.15 Therefore those with high income are 
requested to make loans to the less advantaged without having to extract riba from them. 
Reducing the economic gap between the two factions could thus eliminate inequality and 
subsequently financial exclusion. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Islamic banking sector is the dominant component of Islamic finance and it is a 
rapidly growing part of the global financial sector with this growth trend projected to 
continue.16 This type of banking is based on Shari’ah law. There is a global surge of states 
and business persons dealing or seeking to invest in Islamic banking and finance.17 This is 
mainly attributed to readily steady domestic and foreign markets as well as a myriad 
business opportunities.18 This makes it a lucrative business venture and according to the 
World Bank, global assets held under Islamic finance are approximately 2 trillion US 
Dollars up from 800 billion US Dollars in 2015 growing at 10-12% annually.19 
The Profit and Loss Sharing20 aspect of Islamic banking is also an alternative to 
interest based banking for those seeking credit. This is because unlike conventional banks, 
Islamic banks do not charge interest on principal debts carried out by borrowers.21 Before 
                                                          
14 Noorzoy, M.S. (1982, Feb). Islamic Laws on Riba (interest) and their Economic Implications. Int. J. Middle 
East Stud. 14(1). 6.  
15 ibid  
16 World Bank Group Global Report on Islamic Finance 2016; Islamic Finance; A Catalyst For Shared 
Prosperity at page 3. Accessible at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/25738?show=full 
accessed on September 4, 2017. 
17 Ernst and Young, World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2016 at page 10. Available at 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-world-islamic-banking-competitiveness-report-
2016/$FILE/ey-world-islamic-banking-competitiveness-report-2016.pdf accessed on September 4, 2017. 
18 Ibid  
19 World Bank Group Global Report Op cit (n16) 
20 Under this system, instead of charging a fixed rate of interest on its lending, the bank enters into an equity-
sharing relationship with the client and shares in the risk and return, as well as profit and loss of a joint 
venture. M. Khan M Bhatti, ‘Developments in Islamic Banking; case of the Pakistani’ at page 81. 




the amendment, the then Financial Institutions Act, 2004, had restrictions rendered the 
operation of Islamic banking practices in the country impractical. 
First, section 37 of the Act barred banks from engaging in trade, commerce and industry. 
This prohibition subsequently handicapped the smooth operation of Islamic banking since 
Islamic finance significantly thrives on financial institutions’ engagement in these particular 
sectors as shall be seen later on in this paper.22 Further section 38 of the same Act prohibited 
banks from acquiring immovable property which was otherwise not meant for conducting 
financial institution business. This resultantly crippled Islamic banking since in some 
Islamic finance contracts, a bank must purchase and own an asset before it can resale the 
same to a client/customer at a profit.23 
However, the lucrative nature of the concept has attracted the Ugandan government 
(a predominantly Christian state24, though secular25) to jump on to this Islamic finance 
wagon in an attempt to harness the said opportunities it presents.26 The FIA 2004 was 
subsequently amended to lift the aforementioned restrictions so as to allow Islamic banking 
flourish.  
This importance of Islamic banking is reiterated by the governor of the Bank of Uganda27 
who posits that Islamic banking model where each contract is backed by an underlying asset 
or investment activity leads to a direct link between financial markets and economic 
activity.  This contributes to the spread of real-asset-based finance principles and is ideal for 
financing infrastructure projects.28 This is known as the debt financing model however there 
                                                          
22 Emmanuel Tumusiime Mutebile; ‘Islamic Banking in emerging markets- forging Uganda’s economic 
progress; Keynote speech by the Governor Bank of Uganda at the Islamic Banking Conference Kampala’, on 
the 13th of May 2016. http://www.bis.org/review/r160519f.pdf  
23 This tenet of Islamic finance is known as Murabaha (cost plus sale). This concept according to Hans Visser, 
is a contract that requires the financier to sign two different contracts, one with the supplier of the commodities 
and another with the client to whom the financier will in turn sell to at a profit. ‘Islamic Finance: Principles 
and Practice, 2nd Edition’ at page 68.  
24 According to the 2014 census, over 84 percent of the Ugandan population profess Christian while about 14 
percent of the population adhered to Islam. 
25 Article 7 of The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995. 
26 The Executive Director Supervision, Bank of Uganda (BoU), Ms Justine Bagyenda during an interview with 
a national daily said one of the reasons for Uganda adopting Islamic banking was due to its exponential growth 
and resilience to financial crises. Ismail Musa Ladu, ‘Islamic banking cleared for business, says regulator’. The 
Daily Monitor available at http://www.monitor.co.ug/Business/Islamic-banking-cleared-business-
regulator/688322-3204576-14o1789z/index.html accessed on September 4, 2017. 
27 Emmanuel Tumusiime Mutebile op cit (n22). 




is also, the risk-sharing characteristic of Islamic banking. Herein, the borrower and the bank 
share the risk of any investment on agreed terms, and share any profits or losses between 
them, without recourse to guarantees.29 This therefore encourages lending especially to 
clients who may not have property. 
However this thesis through critique of Islamic finance also questions whether this 
type of banking is without pitfalls. There are existing schools of thought that are opposed to 
Islamic banking such as those that argue that the Islamic concept of replacing of interest 
with profit and loss sharing is not feasible. Timur Kuran for example argues that the 
Murabaha mode of finance requirement for payment of time-value for money is equivalent 
to an interest-based conventional bank loan.30 This mode requires that a trader submits a list 
of requirements he wants to purchase to the Islamic bank which then buys the goods.31 The 
bank then sets a markup price as its compensation for the service rendered and upon 
payment the bank transfers ownership to the client.32 The bank however sends the client a 
bill at an inflated price because of the risk it bears from the time it purchases the 
consignment to the time transfer is made because it does indeed bear the risk during this 
time and would pay in case of damage.33 However in practice, this period of risk is 
negligible because there is no minimum to the duration of the bank’s ownership; a 
millisecond suffices to make the transaction legitimate.34 The bank has no risk, and the 
client pays for the time-value of money.35 The only difference is in form and not in 
substance, which is that the client’s payment is called a “markup” in Islamic banking and 
“interest” in conventional banking.36 
                                                          
29 M. Khan M Bhatti, ‘Developments in Islamic Banking; case of the Pakistani’ at page 81 
30 Timur Kuran, Islam and Mammon; The Economic Predicaments of Islam (Princeton University Press).  
31 ibid.  
32 ibid.  
33 ibid.  
34 ibid. 
35 ibid. 
36 Timur Kuran also argues in The Financial Times article, ‘Islamic finance sits awkwardly in a modern 
business school’ that “Islamic banks give and take interest as a matter of course, though under the guise of 
commissions, fees, penalties or profit shares. The holder of a “halal” credit card pays a penalty on unpaid 
balances; this penalty is proportionate to the size of the balance, which makes it equivalent to interest”. He 
further posits that the shari’ah code was suited to the Middle Ages, when it assumed its classical form and that 
at least on matters of economics and finance, it has not advanced measurably since then. See 





Further, the Islamic banking concept of ‘haram’ is not without criticism. This 
dictates that investment in certain industries such as adult entertainment, narcotics, tobacco, 
alcohol, and gambling is in contravention with Shari’ah law.37 It is the author’s submission 
that this prohibition of investment in certain products may bring about loss of profit 
opportunities in global free trade market. This is especially in respect to the alcohol industry 
where Uganda has been ranked as the world’s leading consumer of alcohol per capita.38 This 
market is clearly profitable in Uganda and the prohibition of investment in it is 
counterintuitive and does not make much economic logic for a sector vying to be a finance 
powerhouse. 
The regulatory and supervisory aspects of Islamic finance further present a 
challenge. Legal complexity from this respect is derived from the nexus between the 
existing conventional banking legal jurisprudence and Islamic law. Reliance on Islamic 
principles leads the sector to operate in an ‘unorthodox’ manner distinguishable from its 
conventional counterparts since the former unlike the latter does not deny existence of a link 
between its modus operandi and religion.39 After deliberating on the Ugandan banking 
sector’s genesis and the various concepts of Islamic banking, this paper will conduct a 
compatibility assessment between Islam and banking. It is this thesis’ position that this dual 
alliance should be a synergy working towards the same goal of economic advancement and 
inclusive growth. This can only be attained through a legislative and supervisory 
equilibrium between the two as opposed to a conflicting dichotomy.  
Similarly, being an emerging industry in Uganda, bank regulators should not 
haphazardly rush to the collect benefits of this Islamic finance without setting up a strong 
legal and institutional frameworks designed to deal with the bank. There should massive 
sensitization and training about the models of Islamic banking. There are lessons which can 
be learned from Malaysia which was ranked as a leading Islamic Finance country and one of 
the top nine core markets for world Islamic banking by The Ernst and Young World Islamic 
                                                          
37 Quran 7:33 
38 World Health Organization Global Status Report on Alcohol 2007. 
39 Iqbal, Zamir, and Abbas Mirakhor. ‘An introduction to Islamic finance: theory and practice’. Vol. 687. John 




Banking Competitiveness Report 2016.40 Malaysia has specific legislation that deals with 
Islamic banking whereas Uganda amended the existing Financial Institutions Act to cater for 
Islamic banking. This may result into a collision within the dual banking structure that is 
conventional and Islamic banking, during their operations since they lay on the same field.   
Pursuant to the Malaysian example, the thesis will propose amendment of tax laws to 
avoid double taxation challenges faced by Islamic finance, that there is need for separate 
structures at some point such as Islamic finance tribunals that would have the expertise to 
specifically handle Islamic banking disputes of a technical manner that a conventional court 
may not effectively handle. 
 
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives 
The objectives of this paper are threefold as follows: 
1.2.1 The first stage is to determine whether or not this new concept of Islamic 
banking is healthy or detrimental to the stakeholders namely, banks, clients 
and the economy at large. Does it close the gap between rich and poor and 
encourage inclusive growth. 
This paper analyses whether the introduction of Islamic finance by the 
Financial Institutions (Amendment) Act 2016 is the much needed panacea to 
help alleviate the obstacles to economic development and financial inclusion. 
In as much as Islamic finance’s impact on Uganda’s economy is likely to be 
exponentially productive, is it possible that it can be detrimental to a largely 
agrarian third world country’s economy like Uganda. Is there any 
opportunity cost or detriment likely to be suffered because of the introduction 
of this type of finance? Are the banks themselves likely to make profits or 
losses 
1.2.2 The second objective is to analyze the regulatory and supervisory structure of 
Islamic banking in Uganda under the Financial Institutions (Amendment) Act 
                                                          
40 Report available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-world-islamic-banking-competitiveness-




and the third is to give recommendations in light of the lessons from 
Malaysia.  
The thesis further sets out to review the new Financial (Amendment) 
Institutions Act in regard to Islamic banking. The growing presence of 
Islamic banking should be supplemented by effective regulation and 
supervision. So the questions to pose are; Whether the Act’s regulatory 
measures are comprehensive to effectively operationalize Islamic banking in 
Uganda; whether there are any legislative and supervisory challenges which 
cannot effectively serve the purpose and meet the objectives for which the 
Act intended. Is Islamic banking properly supervised? Are there sufficient 
structures in conventional banks to support a dual system or should Islamic 
banking operate independent from the former. 
And in the event that there are gaps, the recommendations the country can 
use to fill such lacunas using lessons from Malaysia.    
1.3 Methodology 
Primarily, the paper shall adopt the doctrinal approach through comparative analysis 
of relevant legislation of countries with Islamic finance with more emphasis on Uganda and 
Malaysia so as to best position subsequent recommendations. Reference shall also be, made 
to case law.  
This thesis will also use the narrative methodology in reviewing the literature. This 
is because since the narrative literature review surveys the state of knowledge on a particular 
topic and yet there is scarcely any written paper concerning this study in Uganda. Therefore, 
the literature reviewed ranges from papers in Google scholars, web pages, newspaper 
articles and government documents. The intention is to recommend a standardized 
regulatory framework for Uganda and other low development countries with Islamic 
banking.  
The thesis shall also rely on secondary sources such as journals and articles 
published by the Bank of Uganda, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 




Ministry of Finance of Malaysia, as well as international financial institutions such as The 
World Bank and The International Monetary Fund and other authorities from other 
jurisdictions where Islamic banking has been prevailing.  
In order to fully comprehend the likely impact of Islamic banking in Uganda, 
historical research about the evolution of the banking sector in the country will also play an 
important role in the study. Materials such as Budget speeches, Ministerial instruments, 
cabinet white papers, draft legislation, press releases, news articles, previous legislation and 
older case law will be referred to in order to outline the deeper nuances of contextual and 
historical perspective of the subject matter at hand, and the changes proposed in the current 
legislation.  
1.4 Overview of Chapters 
Chapter two recapitulates the history of banking in Uganda to show the trek the 
country’s banking sector has taken. It also covers the economic and financial inclusion 
status of the country mostly to assist elucidate the degree of impact that Islamic banking is 
likely to have on Uganda as discussed in the section that follows next. To give a contextual 
background into the economic challenges the country faces as of today, 
Chapter three explains what Islamic banking entails, the principles of Islamic 
finance. The rules and regulations that govern the concept according to the Quran. The 
evolution of Islamic finance and its current status on the international scene in the wake of 
globalization. Since Islamic banking has been a new concept in Uganda’s financial sector, 
for hardly a year in existence, this part of the thesis will mainly through thorough 
comparative analysis of other successful jurisdictions (Islamic banking-wise) project the 
likely impact of this type of banking in Uganda.  The use of the current trajectory of the 
Islamic banking trend in Uganda shall also be heavily relied on in deducing the probable 
impact. Overall, this chapter answers the question, whether Islamic banking is beneficial in 
solving the challenges hindering financial inclusion and economic development at large.  
Chapter four assesses whether the Financial Institutions (Amendment) Act 2016, 
being the main legislative basis of Islamic banking in Uganda, sufficiently addresses all 




achieve. It also addresses and analyses the supervisory powers and discretion of the Central 
Bank of Uganda over Islamic banks. It is the position of the author that the existing laws are 
not favorable to the proper functioning of the Islamic banking. Therefore this section aims 
to identify the major regulatory challenges faced by Islamic banking in Uganda and provide 
subsequent recommendations in the next chapter to iron out the quoted issues. 
Chapter five is primarily comparative analysis based on Islamic finance in Malaysia 
which has successfully practiced Islamic banking since 1963 and as such would be an 
appropriate model for an infant Ugandan Islamic banking sector to learn from. They have 
more comprehensive regulatory legislative and technical supervisory bodies, all of which 
can inform my recommendations to the Ugandan scenario. The Ernst and Young World 
Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2016 ranks Malaysia as a leading Islamic Finance 
country and one of the top nine core markets for world Islamic banking; therefore if Uganda 
is to become a force to be reckoned with at the Islamic finance global stage, Malaysia would 













2. THE EVOLUTION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN UGANDA AND 
THE STATUS OF THE ECONOMY AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION. 
2.1 Background and Evolution Of The Banking Sector In Uganda 
2.1.1 Pre-Independence Era 
The first financial institution in Uganda was established in November 1906 and it 
was the National Bank of India.41 Six years later, the second bank, Standard Bank of South 
Africa Limited was established in September 1912 followed by Barclays bank in 1927.42 In 
1954 three more banks; Bank of India, Bank of Baroda and The Nedelandsche Handel-
Maatschappij M.V opened in Uganda.43 The Lombank Uganda Limited opened in 1958 and 
introduced the hire purchase system of shopping in Uganda.44 
The banking system at that time in Uganda did not control much of the financial 
liquidity that was in circulation across the board in the country.45 Saben states that ‘Much of 
the money was controlled in the bazaars and other channels which were predominantly 
controlled by people of the Asian origin…However, areas where banks were non-existent, 
merchants in those areas played the part of the banks’.46 
Other alternative sources of accessing credit at the time were from regular moneylenders 
and through domestic lending, that is, people borrowing from family members or friends for 
short terms and without interest.47Even the few moneylenders’ activities that existed were 
frustrated by a legislation passed by the Uganda Protectorate government in 1951.48 This 
Ordinance provided, interalia, that money lending agreements should be in writing, all 
money lenders should be licensed, interest rates were capped at 23 per cent and no special 
                                                          
41 Later taken up to become Grindlys Bank and played the role of banker to the Government till the Bank of 
Uganda was established. 
42 Henry Lubega, ‘The First Bank In Uganda’ Daily Monitor March 1, 2016.Available at 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/Insight/The-first-bank-in-Uganda/688338-2638762-tje191z/index.html 
accessed on May 21, 2017.  
43 ibid. 
44ibid. 
45 HBT. "Saben's Commercial Directory and Handbook of Uganda, 1947-48." (1948): 100-100. 
46 ibid. 
47 Department of Cooperative Development Annual Report 1948 at Page 5. 




protection was afforded to African borrowers.49This placed stringent measures on would be 
lenders and deterred people from seeking loans since there were high interest rates.50 
Moreover at that time, not many Ugandans had received a formal education to be able to 
draft or read the legally required agreements need before engaging in a money lending 
transaction. Consequently money lending in Uganda was practiced on a small scale and 
mainly by the Asian community.51 
Further, during the colonial times leading up to independence in October 1962, 
Ugandans did not hold substantive securities to obtain credit from the commercial banks.52 
This is because they were mainly vested in subsistence agriculture and little output was left 
for commercial purposes.53 Subsistence farming accounted for just over 50 percent of 
African agricultural products in 1950.54 
The agricultural practice by most communities was on a fragmented basis and small scale 
which led to low productivity.55 The prevailing land tenure system56 that vested most of the 
Ugandan land to the British imperialists and individual traditional rulers meant that most 
people had no land to use as collateral security for loans from the banks.57 Besides the banks 
were reluctant to issue loans to a subsistence farmer likely to fail in meeting their repayment 
obligations timely or ever.58 
In 1950, cognizant of this barrier to credit access, the colonial government passed 
the Uganda Credit and Savings Bank Act59that established the Uganda Credit and Savings 
Bank. Its mandate was to provide credit to Africans with the objective of furthering 
agriculture, commercial building and cooperative society purposes in the protectorate.60 In 
1950, it issued 830 application forms between 2nd October and 31st December and in 
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response, 298 members of the general public submitted forms to the bank requesting for 
loans worth Uganda Shillings (UGX) 4,533,900/=. Of these, only 166 worth UGX 
829,300/= were approved.61 
2.1.2. Post-Independence Era; A Nascent Banking Sector 
In 1966 the Bank of Uganda (BOU) was established as the nation’s Central 
Bank.62The BoU under the Act had powers to control credit of banks and determine rates of 
interest commercial banks were to follow.63 As of contemporary times under the amended 
Bank of Uganda Act 199364, the BOU is a body corporate with perpetual succession and a 
common seal and may sue or be sued in its corporate name.65 Section 4 of the BOU Act 
stipulates the functions of the bank. It provides that, “without prejudice to the generality of 
subsection (1), the bank is mandated with maintaining monetary stability;66 maintaining an 
external assets reserve;67 issuing currency notes and coins;68 being the banker to the 
Government;69 acting as financial adviser to the Government and manager of public debt;70 
advising the Government on monetary policy as is provided under section 32(3) of the BOU 
Act;71 where appropriate, act as agent in financial matters for the Government;72 be the 
banker to financial institutions;73 be the clearing house for cheques and other financial 
instruments for financial institutions;74 supervise, regulate, control and discipline all 
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financial institutions and pension funds institutions;75 and where appropriate, participate in 
the economic growth and development programs.”76 
The following era was characterized by misguided financial policies77 and 
intermittent wars by the turbulent political regime led by President Idi Amin (1972-1979) 
which grossly affected the banking sector. Out of the 290 commercial bank branches 
existent in Uganda in 1970, only 84 existed by the end of 1987, of which 58 branches were 
operated by government-owned banks.78 This drop is mainly attributed to the fact that Idi 
Amin expelled foreigners mainly Asians79 and British subjects of Asian descent from 
Uganda.80 This created a harsh economic environment for foreign investors and likely 
deterred would be bankers from venturing into the sector.81 The already established foreign 
banks, for fear of being persecuted by the government,82 had to reduce further investment 
into the sector because of the looming uncertainty over their heads and this inadvertently 
and subsequently led to a reduction in bank activities in the nation.83 The expulsion of the 
foreigners subsequently led to the expansion of government owned Uganda Commercial 
Bank and Cooperative Bank as the foreign owned businesses were nationalized and 
assimilated by public ones.84  
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2.1.3. A New Dawn: Bank And Economic Reform 
With the advent of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) regime in 1986, 
security was restored to most of the country which invigorated the banking sector and 
economy at large.85 Many of the administrative controls on the economy were subsequently 
liberalized and this saw the number of branches begin to increase gradually and a rise in 
banking activity signaled a resilient economic recuperation.86 By 1990, the number of 
commercial bank branches had risen to 237, consequently increasing access by the populace 
to financial services provided by the banks.87  
In between late 1980’s to mid-2000, the banking sector underwent several policy, 
legal and regulatory reforms. There was a renewed interest in the country by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These gave technical and monetary 
assistance to restructure the Ugandan economy, mainly through Policy Framework Papers, 
which played a fundamental role in the economic reform of Uganda starting from 1988.88 In 
1987, the government with the support of both IMF and World Bank established the 
comprehensive Economic Recovery Program (ERP) with an aim to restore fiscal discipline, 
monetary stability, and price liberalization, attract foreign exchange inflows, improve the 
climate for private investment and savings, and rehabilitate the economy through bringing 
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2.1.4. Distress In The Banking Sector 
Despite a promising and growing economy, the banking sector during the 1990’s and 
2000’s found itself in an alarming distress situation. This period saw several local banks 
become insolvent while others were taken over by the BoU that would subsequently sell 
them off. This affliction was mainly attributed to poor corporate governance practice by 
these banks.90 There was gross neglect of prudential regulation and supervision by the Bank 
of Uganda which led to internal mismanagement and skirting of basic corporate governance 
rules by both government and private banks.91 Regulation 3 of the Financial Institutions 
(Corporate Governance) Regulations, 2005 defines corporate governance within the context 
of financial institutions as the process and structure used to direct and manage the business 
and affairs of a financial institution with the objective of ensuring its safety and soundness 
and enhancing shareholder value.92 At the core of proper corporate governance is an 
inference that the insiders who control the management of a firm do not abuse their control 
and act in a manner deleterious to the interests of outsiders.93 This was not the case as in 
many of these failed banks, a dominant shareholder would use their position to unduly 
influence bank management which subsequently led to abuses such as pervasive insider 
lending. According to Governor Emmanuel-Mutebile, the losses incurred on insider loans 
were the primary cause to the collapse of these banks.94  In many of the failed banks, a 
dominant shareholder or group of shareholders would exert undue influence over the 
management, which would result in abuses such as pervasive insider lending.95 The losses 
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incurred on bad insider loans were the single most leading cause of bank collapse.96 In 
diagnosing the high rate of failure by banks, Brownbridge,97observes that some of the closed 
banks were in distress because they were ponderously insolvent and put under liquidation 
with minimal delay.98   
In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, the BOU embarked on a number 
of reforms to reinforce the regulatory framework. Top of these was adopting the Basel III 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio in dealing with liquidity regulation. In November 2010, BOU 
directed commercial banks in to raise their minimum capital to UGX 10 billion 
(approximately US$4.34 million)99 by March 2011, and to UGX 25 billion (approximately 
US$11 million) by March 2013.  
The BOU further launched the development and implementation of a National Strategy for 
Financial Inclusion, under which financial consumer protection guidelines were issued to 
financial institutions in 2011.100  In March 2011, the Central Bank also issued Consolidated 
Supervision Regulation to all banks101 which required all banks to report under these 
regulations as by 31st December of every year. These reforms have consequently improved 
the BOU’s supervisory and regulatory potential as it now conducts on-site examination of 
all commercial banks using a risk-based supervision methodology and off site surveillance 
of these institutions. A recent BOU survey suggests that overall the sector is still sound with 
bank liquidity and capital buffers above the legal minimum.102  
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2.2. Status Of The Economy And Financial Inclusion In Uganda 
2.2.1. Gapping Inequality And Financial Exclusion  
The banking sector is a central player in economic growth and inclusivity since it is 
a conduit through which finances are distributed.103 The significance of financial inclusion 
cannot be understated. It is the author’s submission that an inclusive, deep and widely 
accessible banking system goes a long way in promoting equal income levels and 
eradicating poverty. Such efficient intermediation motivates saving, facilitates access to 
credit for intending borrowers and reduces the cost of obtaining credit which subsequently 
lowers the gross transactional costs for enterprises making them attractive and competitive 
which is an aspect the nation is in dire need of.104  
According to the Oxfam Uganda Inequality Report, 2017, Uganda has alarmingly 
high rates of inequality with the richest 10 percent of the population enjoying 35.7 percent 
of national income while the poorest 10 percent claim only 2.5 percent and the poorest 20 
percent have only 5.8 percent.105 This goes to show the scathing levels of unfair distribution 
of finances to different segments of societies. Unsurprisingly the same report states that 
development has been skewed towards urban places mainly with less concern for the rural 
areas.106 The incidence of poverty is significantly higher in rural localities at 22.8 percent of 
the population than in urban places which stands at 9.3 percent.107 Poverty levels are also 
more prevalent in the North and Eastern parts of the country with the Western and Central 
divisions having lower incidences.108  
One the other hand, the status of financial inclusion in Uganda is sound, at least on 
paper. As a member of the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), the Bank of Uganda 
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(BOU) signed the Maya Declaration wherein it committed to formulate financial inclusion 
strategies109 and further under the Sasana Accord signed in 2013 in Kuala Lampur, the BOU 
committed to reach a target of 70 percent overall financial inclusion in Uganda by 2017. 
BOU has since then, timely executed most of these committed policies110 and a FinScope 
Survey adopted by BOU suggests that Uganda has overachieved in this regard with overall 
financial inclusion rate of 85 percent which is way and above the targeted rate.111  
The BOU should be lauded for this achievement however, there remains a question of 
whether these statistics indeed reflect what is on ground. Rachel Mindra Katoroogo, a 
lecturer at Makerere University Business School, Department of Finance, disagrees.112 She 
states that the numbers are far from reality after a locus visit to some rural parts. A greater 
segment of Ugandans, mostly poor, live in long forgotten rural areas in the North and 
Eastern part of the country. Even people in urban areas leaving in townships are badly off in 
terms of access to credit.113 Mindra asserts that  “the definition of financial inclusion does 
not simply mean access to financial services but most importantly availability, usage and 
quality of the formal financial system for all income segments of the economy both urban 
and rural alike with dignity.”114  This assertion is valid since people may have bank 
accounts and operative mobile money profiles but this is irrelevant if there is no availability 
of finances. Further the numbers do not reflect the number of withdrawals, deposits or 
credit/debit card swipes on accounts per month and the frequency of mobile money 
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transactions on average per month.115 So while there may be a significant number of people 
with accounts, this may not necessarily mean that they have access to credit. 
2.2. Key Challenges Encountered By Government In Accelerating Shared 
Prosperity Through Financial Inclusion. 
This part discusses some of the major challenges hindering financial inclusion and 
deepening in the country. The list may not be exhaustive but rather provides the gaps that 
the introduction of Islamic banking can help seal. 
The high cost of accessing said credit in the first place is a major problem.116 
Uganda ranks in the 120th position out of 138 states in affordability of financial services.117 
This is mainly attributed to among others, high interest rates that usually range from 22 to 
25 per cent of the principal sum borrowed.118 As of June 2016, commercial bank lending 
rates averaged 23.54 per cent and banks have been heavily criticized for their high lending 
rates to the private sector.119 Although as of April 2017, the BOU had reduced the Central 
Bank Rate (CBR) by 0.5 per cent points to 11 per cent,120 this still remains a relatively high 
figure that will consequently likely force the conventional commercial banks to charge a 
higher interest rate to the public that wishes to obtain credit.121It is no wonder Uganda’s 
overall domestic credit to GDP ratio over the past ten years has scored at an abysmal 
average of 13 per cent.122 The World Bank reports that the population has shied away from 
banks mainly because of their increasingly stringent conditions for borrowing occasioned by 
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worsening quality of loans that had reduced private sector credit by 1.6 percent by 
September 2016.123 
This is partly why a recourse for saving the economy may lie with Islamic banking on this 
aspect. One main deterrent of loan application in conventional banking is interest taking 
which is prohibited in Islam.124 Therefore, it is a reasonable assumption that people are 
likely to use this interest free banking alternative to circumvent the high interest rates and as 
such alleviate this problem.  
Further, since the application of interest rate in transactions is prohibited, Islamic banks lend 
out money only on the basis of profit-sharing arrangements or other modes of financing 
permissible under Islamic law.125This could help source Uganda’s ambitious infrastructure 
venture as will be further discussed in the next chapter. This venture has partly been the 
reason Uganda’s public debt stands at 35 percent of the GDP.126 It has risen by 12.7% in the 
past four years from 25.9% of GDP in 2012/13, to 38.6% of GDP in the 2016/17 financial 
year. Despite government’s attempts to expand its financing base, Uganda’s capital 
expenditures are still heavily dependent on external finance. Currently debt servicing 
accounts for 11 per cent of the total government expenditure making it one of the highest 
debt burdens in sub-Saharan Africa.127 Uganda’s GDP has averaged 4.5%, a pace notably 
lower than that of the East African Community members.128    
Secondly, apart from deterring new loan applications, high interest rates in Uganda 
have led to low repayments on loans by borrowers thereby inadvertently increasing the 
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number of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs hereinafter).129 The IMF defines NPLs as 
“loans…when payments of interest and/or principal are past due by 90 days or more, or 
interest payments equal to 90 days or more have been capitalized, refinanced, or delayed by 
agreement, or payments are less than 90 days overdue, but there are other good 
reasons.”130 
The BOU Financial Stability Report for 2016 shows that there was an increase in NPLs 
from 4 percent of total loans in June 2015 to 8.3 percent in June 2016.131 The BOU however 
maintained that there was no cause for alarm since the NPL rates were still below the 
international standard for classifying NPLs as critical which stand at 10 percent.132 This has 
as of February 2017 risen to 10.5 percent, the highest in more than a decade.133  
It would seem the banking sector remembered nothing and forgot everything about the 
magnitude of the threat posed by NPLs which were the leading cause of its yesteryears’ 
financial distress.134  
Last year saw BOU take over the third largest bank in the country, Crane Bank 
Uganda Limited.135 The Central bank stated that at the time of takeover, at least 20 percent 
of total loans in the bank were NPLs which partly led to its shut down.136 Such Constant 
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distraught in the sector is likely to distort the economy and diminish public confidence in 
banks thereby discouraging the growth of a banked population.137  
Another cause of financial exclusion is the big informal sector. In Uganda, a 
significant amount of business is conducted informally. According to UBOS 2014, over 50 
per cent of GDP is ascribed to the informal sector,138 yet the World Bank estimates that only 
1 in 10,000 entrepreneurs in Uganda is able to successfully obtain credit.139 This is 
attributed to the fact that many of these informal businesses do not easily satisfy the 
requirements of the formal financial sector.140 Banks require proper registration in order to 
open business bank accounts and disburse loans. Since registration fees are often 
prohibitively expensive for small business owners, and the processes for registration are 
cumbersome, they limit the use of such services by these businesses.141 
As seen, this situation coupled with an ailing economy have contributed to lower consumer 
and investor confidence in the banking sector. As thus, a call for an immediate conspiring of 
the government and the private sector to save the situation is imminent.  
Can interest free banking associated with Islamic Finance be the key to unlocking 
this plight of financial services affordability and poor loan quality? Can the Islamic banking 
resilience to global financial crises as well as the nature of Shari’ah-Compliant finance 
models that focus on the principles of investment in real assets and risk-sharing142 be the 
much needed breath of fresh air to re-ignite customer and investor confidence in Uganda’s 
fiscal arena.   
    
 
                                                          
137 The World Bank, op cit (n116). 
138 And 80 percent of the labor force work in the informal economy.  See Andrew Rugasira ‘Unpacking 
Uganda’s Informal Sector’ The Independent. May 22, 2016.  Available at 
https://www.independent.co.ug/unpacking-ugandas-informal-sector/  accessed on June 6, 2017. 
139 ibid. 
140 ibid. 
141 Bemanya Tumwebaze, ‘The bonus of formalizing your business’ The Daily Monitor published on 
December 14, 2016. Available at http://www.monitor.co.ug/Business/Prosper/The-bonus-of-formalising-your-
business/688616-3485242-format-xhtml-81qcepz/index.html last accessed on June 6, 2017. 
142 Key Note Address by the Governor BoU, at the Islamic Banking Conference available at 
https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/bou-downloads/speeches/GovernorsSpeeches/2016/May/ISLAMIC-BANKING-





3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC FINANCE AND ITS PROJECTED 
IMPACT ON INCLUSIVE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN UGANDA 
3.1.Evolution of Islamic Banking 
This section provides a brief genesis of the emergence and development of Islamic 
banking from the early era through the middle to modern times. As will be discussed later 
on in this paper, Islamic banking system is a financial system governed by Shari’ah law. 
This is religious law derived from precepts of Islam, particularly the Quran and the Hadith 
which are records narrating the words, actions or habits of the legendary Islamic Prophet 
Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) (herein PBUH).143  
The origin of Islamic banking can be traced back to the dawn of Islam 1,400 years 
ago. Historical scholars indicate that the early years of Islam show that during the first 
century of Islam (AD 600), there were some forms of Islamic finance that were similar to 
contemporary banking transactions such as Islamic partnerships (known as Mudarabah in 
modern Islamic finance). 144  
The medieval era began with the end of the reign of Caliph Uthman in 661 A.C 
though banking activities which were practiced in the former era were continued.145 With 
the fall of the Islamic empire occasioned by the rise of the Roman Empire, there were 
substantial consequences on the fiscal activities of Muslim nations.146 
Islamic finance revivalism however in response was first re-established in Mit 
Ghamr, Egypt 1963 with the Mit Ghamr Savings Bank.147 This provided a basic financial 
institution bouquet which included deposits, loans, equity participation, direct investments 
and it relied on Shari’ah philosophy and was welcomed by the local populace.148 With time, 
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the system spread over and by the 1970’s many Islamic banks were thriving.149  Some 
countries that were practicing Islamic finance came together under the auspices of the 
umbrella group, the Organization of Islamic countries (OIC) in 1974, and established a 
global bank called Islamic Development Bank (IDB).150 Its objective was to engage in 
intergovernmental activities primarily to furnish funds for economic development of 
projects in member countries.151   
3.1.1 Current Status Of Islamic Banking At The Global Stage 
The global Islamic finance industry grew from US$1.66 trillion in 2013 to US$2.1 
trillion in 2014.152 Consultancy firm PricewaterhouseCoopers has projected that this 
industry will grow to US$2.7 trillion by end of 2017.153 According to Ernst & Young, the 
Islamic retail and commercial banking assets continued to grow at 16% in 2014 and 2015 by 
2020, the global Islamic banking industry profit pool is slated to peak at US$30.3 billion.154 
Islamic banking assets in the six core markets of Qatar, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia Malaysia, 
United Arab Emirates and Turkey are projected to reach US$1.8 trillion by 2019.155  
These success stories on the international scene can be replicated in Uganda’s 
emerging markets if Islamic Banking principles are properly adhered to through proper 
regulation. 
3.2.  Principles Of Islamic Banking As Catalyst For Inclusive Economic Growth  
The amendment in clause 1 (amending section 3 of the Financial Institutions Act) 
defines an Islamic financial institution as “a company licensed to carry on financial 
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institution business in Uganda whose entire business comprises Islamic financial business 
and which has declared to the Central Bank that its entire operations are and will be 
conducted in accordance with the Shari’ah.”  The FIA Amendment Act156 then defines 
Islamic financial business as being financial institutions business which includes the 
business of receiving property into profit-sharing investment accounts or of managing such 
accounts any other business of a financial institution which is carried out Shari’ah and 
which includes (1) equity or partnership financing, including musharakah, musharakah 
mutanaqisah and mudarabah, (2) lease based financing, including al-ijarah, alijarah 
muntahia bi al-tamlik and al-ijarah thumma al-bai, (3) sale based financing, including 
istisna`, bai` bithaman ajil, bai` salam, murabahah and musawamah, (4) currency exchange 
contracts and (5) fee based activity, including wakalah.157 
This chapter defines key Islamic finance principles and what these Shari’ah compliant 
finance models are like and discusses whether they are the solution to Uganda’s financial 
exclusion predicament. 
3.2.1. Transactions Or Products Prohibited Under Islamic Finance  
Haram 
Shari’ah imposes a set of ethical rules militating against exploitation and investing 
in ventures that are considered morally distasteful.158 As such investment in certain 
industries such as adult entertainment, narcotics, tobacco, alcohol, and terrorism is in 
contravention with Shari’ah law.159   
As submitted earlier, the prohibition of investment in certain products may bring 
about loss of profit opportunities found in some ventures such as the alcohol or pork 
businesses. For example Uganda is the second largest global consumer of pork160 and 
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biggest consumer of alcohol per capita in the world.161 Since Islamic finance prohibits trade 
in any of these two sinful ventures and more, then an opportunity to tap into this market is 
missed out and also the public that wishes to access credit engage in this business are 
forsaken. For instance, a study in Pakistan found that Islamic banks were comparatively 
underperforming on the basis of their business model and operational efficiency levels 
although they had better asset quality and superior stability position than conventional 
banks.162 This is because they always have comparatively less credit placement 
opportunities than conventional banks because of avoidance of investment avenues which 
are repugnant to Islamic principles.163  
Furthermore, the author submits that if absolute adherence to this principle was to be 
upheld, many other ventures that deal in products which are not acceptable to Muslims, even 
if their main business is halal (opposite of haram, that is, activities that are permitted by 
Islam) would be left out. Food retailers, hotels and airlines, for example, often derive a 
fraction of their profits from alcohol or pork food sales, but does this mean that such 
businesses are to be categorized with breweries and exempted from any Islamic investment 
portfolio? 
However there are some illegal activities that are forbade which constructive 
inasmuch as it prevents the financing of some bad practices such as terrorism which 
destabilized the Ugandan economy in recent times.164  Therefore prohibition in investment 
in such activities is good for the economy. 
Speculation/Chance  
This is also known as gharar – excessive risk-taking (for instance spread betting and 
hedge funds). Gharar is prohibited by Islam because of the ‘ignorance’ or ‘lack of 
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knowledge’ and the broad risk of uncertainty.165 Speculation is where two parties enter a 
contract and one party lacks complete information or both parties do not have control over 
the underlying transaction.166 Whilst Islamic teaching encourages trading, investment and 
charitable giving, it prohibits the production of money by money since it requires financial 
transactions be asset-backed as will be seen further on in this thesis.167 This creates a direct 
link between financial markets and economic activity thus contributing to the spread of real-
asset-based finance principles.168 This has been evidenced in many jurisdictions which 
consider it an ideal option for the financing of infrastructure projects.169 This would provide 
Uganda with a conducive environment for achieving a more integrated approach to 
economic growth. This would further be a viable option for Uganda’s government in its 
pursuit to develop infrastructure without having to resort to external debt. 
It is imperative to differentiate the activities of speculators from those of legitimate 
investors. The later involves the rational use of knowledge, and the rewards come from 
having and knowing how to use information whereas speculative gains come from seeking 
out risk.170 As explained in the next section of this chapter, with Islamic finance models 
such as the Mudarbah, there are rewards for risk sharing, but this activity of taking on the 
risk of others is different in nature from intentionally seeking risk.171 
Speculation increases risk for all market participants by churning stock, or by 
engaging in destabilizing buying and selling. Yet it is impossible to prevent speculative 
investment in equity and bond markets through regulation.172 It is only the intent of the 
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speculator, which becomes manifest latter on, which distinguishes speculation from genuine 
investment.173Hence conscience is the ultimate check. This implies that individual investors 
must honestly examine their motives and objectives for a certain venture and ensure that 
they are not in the business of mere speculation. This can benefit financial stability and 
constrain leverage.174  
Interest/Riba 
As earlier pointed out, one of the key tenets of Islamic finance is that it prohibits 
interest-based transactions/instruments.175 Riba (interest) means to increase, grow, or 
multiply into more than what would be due.176 Riba prohibition is not exclusive restriction 
of interest only but also refers to the prohibition of undeserved profit gained from 
quantitative inequality of the counter value interest or usury that is reimbursing more than 
the principal advanced would then be one form of riba;177 imposition of late fees would be 
an example of non interest riba.178 
The basis for this prohibition of riba on consumption loans is stemmed in the need to 
promote societal justice and equality by redistributing the purchasing power from the rich to 
the poor.179 This is because it is assumed that those who borrow are seeking to maintain 
some minimum standard of living and as such to make a profit off them is against the spirit 
of charity.180 However some Islamic finance scholars such as Timur Kuran have argued that 
those who insist on banning interest are ignorant of Islamic history and guilty of 
misinterpreting the Quran which he claims that it does not ban interest but rather prohibits 
usury or exorbitant interest.181 Nonetheless what the two schools of thought do not dispute is 
the forbidding of interest. 
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Riba/interest is ubiquitous in contemporary debt based economy. It is present in 
credit cards, automobile loans and home mortgages in the form of simple or compound 
interests.182This subsequently raises two questions of critical importance. The first is about 
the practicality of an interest-free banking sector and secondly whether such is healthy for 
economic development and reducing the income inequality gap. 
Interest free banking in Islamic finance is very practical because it is replaced by 
modes of lending which involve equity, sale or leasing through Profit-Loss Sharing (PLS) 
concept. This will be discussed in the next section but basically means a business 
partnership between the bank and the customer for the former to fund the latter’s project and 
profits and losses are shared by both parties.183 
However purists disagree that at some point, there is an intersection with ‘interest’. 
They for example argue that then all investment in western markets and those of most 
Muslim countries is unacceptable, as quoted companies inevitably deal with riba-based 
banks.184 
Nonetheless, Islamic finance’s direct avoidance of ‘interest’ encourages relative 
economic stability and as such is healthy for the economy. This is because of its interest free 
system that is asset based in nature rather than interest based which is always fluctuating.185 
In Islamic banking, financing is based on real assets and therefore, Islamic products can 
only grow in step with the rise of real economy, thereby reducing excessive speculation and 
accelerating credit expansion.186 A monetary system which is relying on interest free assets 
is proposed to have lesser element of uncertainty thus is more predictable and has reliable 
links to monetary policy objectives.187 As such, Islamic finance would be a viable 
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alternative for Ugandans given that it is better suited to weather economic and financial 
crisis associated with interest rate fluctuations unlike conventional banking which is 
affiliated with such risks as seen in chapter two of this thesis.188  
It is further submitted that circumventing the payment of interest on loans would 
also help in the reduction of NPLs. This is because these fluctuating interest rates in Uganda 
have been a root cause for delayed or non-payment of loans as seen in chapter two above.189 
Since the NPLs are also among the causes of financial distress in the banking sector, an 
interest-free banking system would help avoid this scenario.190 The logic of this claim is 
simple.  Since NPLs have been a root cause for the resolution of banks in the country,191 a 
reduction in their rates would consequently solve the problem of banks shutting down which 
would then restore public confidence in the banking sector and subsequently increase the 
banked population thereby increasing financial inclusion.  
However it should be noted that because of this nature, Islamic banks have extra 
liquidity challenges since they mainly deal in real property but nonetheless this situation 
benefits Islamic banks in terms of less Non-Performing Assets thus they have better asset 
quality.192 This would help Uganda reduce its already high prevalent rate of Non-
Performing Assets that have threatened the sector and economy at large as seen in the above 
chapters. 
The positive effects flowing from the interest-free Islamic finance on financial 
inclusion have been witnessed in some countries as reported by the World Bank.  The Bank 
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states that in OIC countries with Islamic Banking in 2014, 31 percent of the working age 
population had a bank account compared to the 17 percent in countries that did not have 
Islamic banking. Furthermore, between 2011 and 2014, the financial depth, measured as 
private sector credit to GDP stood at 39.5 percent of GDP in countries with Islamic finance 
compared to the 34 percent without Islamic banking.193 Although not all success in this 
regard can be allotted to Islamic finance, it does nonetheless play a central role in increasing 
access to finance and creating financial depth which is critical for economic growth and 
development. 
However, it is the author’s submission that the prohibition of interest on money 
subsequently makes it difficult for devout Muslims to partake in the paying or receiving of 
interest. This makes it hard for them to use conventional bank products such as savings 
accounts, loans, mortgages and credit cards as well as discouraging foreign direct 
investments from the staunch Muslim would be investors. Therefore depending on one’s 
perspective, Islamic finance can be considered detrimental to the economy since it 
discourages a section of the devout Muslim population from accessing credit through the 
use of products that come with interest.194 This would subsequently reduce rate of financial 
inclusion.  
Alternatively, one can look at Islamic finance as tool of accelerating financial 
inclusion; a complementary option to the conventional system. It was reported that a section 
of the Ugandan population especially Muslims had cited absence of Islamic banking that is 
in line with Islamic finance as sole reason for not having a bank account.195 With the 
establishment of Islamic banking in Uganda, this will be done away with which will not 
only help boost financial inclusion but also attract Foreign Direct Investment from members 
of the Muslim Arab world. Also some of the transactions that caused the global financial 
crisis are forbidden by Islamic finance and this consequently encourages stability. Activities 
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such as investing in or financing toxic assets, derivatives, and conventional financial 
institution securities all of which are prohibited by Islamic banking but were carried out by 
the conventional banks are said to have contributed to the crisis.196 
 
3.2.2. Islamic Finance Modes and Their Projected Implication on Uganda’s 
Economy. 
Profit and Loss Sharing 
Suppose a bank lent ZAR 1000 to an entrepreneur seeking to kick start a project, at 5 
percent interest for a period of one year; the bank would be entitled to exactly ZAR 1050 at 
the end of the year, since its return is predetermined. However the entrepreneur's return 
depends on the success of their project. That is, if their project’s revenue exceeds ZAR 
1050, they will make a profit. If it is below ZAR 1050, they will incur a loss.  
As seen above, this is different from interest-based lending that vests the risk of loss entirely 
on the borrower (entrepreneur in this hypothetical) which under the interpretation of Islam is 
prohibited as sinful and unfair. So an alternative mode of funding is used in Islamic 
banking, ergo Profit and Loss Sharing. 
Unlike conventional banking, Islamic financing is more of a trading activity than a 
financing one since it is mainly based on risk participation of all parties implying that two or 
more parties share not only the profits but also the risks of a joint venture.197 It is for this 
reason that Islamic banking was initially impossible to operate by virtue of sections 37 and 
38 of the then FIA, 2004 but these were repealed by the FIA Amendment Act 2016 to allow 
this finance based module operate.198 This has made way for the emergence of the Islamic 
finance mode of PLS. 
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Under PLS, an Islamic bank's lending operations are based on the same principle of 
risk sharing, that is, when the bank lends money to a firm, it agrees to share in the losses of 
the underwritten business activities in return for a share of any profits.199 This resultantly, in 
comparison to interest based finance, is a fairer bargain to the parties and more so the 
debtor. This is because profit from business is uncertain whereas the excess amount the 
debtor pays accruing from interest is certain since it is predetermined as seen above. 
Therefore insistence on a sum certain in return for that which is uncertain is detrimental to 
the debtor.200     
Mohammad Najatuallah Siddiqui, a leading Islamic finance pioneer proposed a two-tier 
model as the basis of an interest-free banking with Mudarabah (trustee finance) and 
Musharaka (equity participation).201 These are further provided for under section 1(m) of 
the FIA 2016.  
Mudaraba/ Partnership financing202  
Under Mudaraba, an investor or silent partner (rabbu-ul-mal) entrusts capital to an 
entrepreneur (working partner or mudarib), who invests these funds, and then returns to the 
investor a pre-specified share of the resulting profits, along with their principal; the 
remaining share accrues to the entrepreneur as a remuneration for their time and labour. 203 
In the event of loss, the financial loss is entirely born by the investor, while the 
entrepreneur's loss is only but their spent labour efforts and time. This model inadvertently 
avoids the imposition of oppressively high interest rates on poor households and small 
entrepreneurs thereby reducing the head-costs of acquiring credit hence encouraging 
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inclusion.204 This is a good solution for Uganda since it is the high costs of credit access that 
mainly hinder the acceleration of financial inclusion as seen in chapter two. 
Musharaka / Equity based finance205 
With Musharaka, the entrepreneur makes a financial commitment to his project by 
supplementing with some of his own capital to that already supplied by the investor(s), 
exposing himself to a risk of capital loss.206  
Therefore unlike conventional banks that base their loan disbursement decisions mainly on 
creditworthiness of its applicants,207 Islamic finance’s PLS modules primarily focus on the 
potential profitability of the suggested business venture.208 This is good for Uganda’s 
economy where only 1 in 10,000 entrepreneurs has access to credit.209 This is because 
although an applicant entrepreneur may not be creditworthy and with no property to use as 
collateral security, if their proposed project is economically promising they may succeed in 
securing a loan from an Islamic bank yet fail to secure a conventional bank loan for their 
project. This would promote deeper financial inclusion status in Uganda and ease access to 
credit and encourage productivity and real economic activity. 
Furthermore, unlike their conventional counterparts, Islamic banks are involved in 
the implementation of the projects the entrepreneur underwrites, and at times they even 
supply managerial know-how.210 Proponents of Islamic finance posit that this technique is 
highly similar to the venture capital industry which has fostered the rise of many new 
enterprises in many advanced economies and that Islamic banking can replicate those same 
results.211 This technical knowledge addition is likely to improve the project’s success 
prospects and ensure returns than one where money is just disbursed without diligence done 
about the project’s viability.  
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Therefore on that premise, there are high chances that Islamic banking can make an 
equally significant contribution to Uganda's economic development. A banking structure 
that pegs its loan disbursement decisions on project viability does not reject projects with 
excellent long-term prospects or would be entrepreneurs merely because of a bad financial 
track record. Consequently, it would seem to advance credit more efficiently than one that 
insists on demonstrated creditworthiness. The direct implication of this is rapid inclusive 
growth and benefit for all involved stakeholders: entrepreneurs, who find it easier to finance 
their projects; financial institutions, who share in the profits of the projects they underwrite; 
and depositors, whose investment accounts earn greater returns. 
From the above, it is clear that both Mudaraba and Musharaka require particularly 
vigilant reporting and a high level of transparency for profits and losses to be distributed 
fairly. Consequently, given their complexity and repayment schedule and lack of proper 
accounting, they may result in substantial operating costs, particularly for micro and small 
enterprises that are not accustomed to formal accounting.212  This leads back to the high cost 
of accessing credit challenge and to avoid it, good corporate governance practices by the 
banks must be ensured by the Shari’ah advisory boards so as to encourage integrity and 
transparency that dispenses the need for hiring accountants by the clients.  
Murabaha/ Sale based financing213 
Under this mode, a trader submits a list of goods they want to purchase to the bank. 
The bank then buys the goods and marks up its price as compensation for the service 
rendered upon which it then transfers the ownership to the client.214 This exposes risk to the 
bank for that period before transfer. It is for this reason that the client then receives a bill at 
an inflated price to be paid at a date in the future.215 Some scholars have criticized this as 
un-Islamic since the risk involved could be negligible, given that there is no minimum 
duration period of the bank's ownership; a minute suffices to make the transaction 
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legitimate.216 This makes Murabaha equivalent to an interest-based conventional banking 
loan: the bank bears no risk, and the client pays for the time-value of money and ultimately 
the only difference lies in semantics, which is that the client's payment is titled "service 
charge" or "markup" in one case and "interest" in the other. However Islamic banking under 
Murabaha does not involve penalties for late payment, while conventional banking requires 
it under interest and as such the former may be a less strenuous mode of credit 
access.217However for this model to be instrumental in deepening financial inclusion by 
reducing cost of obtaining credit, care must be made in the way banks and clients structure 
their arrangements. This is because managing the transfer of the assets results in operational 
costs that are often higher than disbursement of cash in conventional microfinance, costs 
that are likely passed on to the consumer.218 This also has tax implications as will be seen in 
chapter four. 
Another mode under this branch is known as the ‘bai salam’ as stipulated under 
Section 1(m)(b)(iii) FIA 2016. This is a sale whereby the seller undertakes to supply some 
specific goods to the buyer at a future date in exchange for an advance price fully paid on 
spot.219 The basic purpose of this sale contract is to meet the needs of the small farmers who 
need money to grow their crops and to feed their families up until the time of harvest.220 
This is a critical tool for improving credit access to the 69 percent of the Ugandan 
population directly and indirectly involved in agriculture.221 This would subsequently 
improve the agricultural sector which contributes to 26 percent of the nation’s Gross 
Domestic Product.222 
Ijara/ Lease finance223 
This means a contract which enables possession of a particular intended usufruct of 
the leased asset for a consideration.224 The bank rents an asset to the client who is an end 
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user for a specified duration of time at an agreed rental fee that reflects the assets’ cost as 
well as time-value of money. The end user retains the option of buying the asset. This has 
the underlying concept of risk sharing since the bank owns the asset for some time and if it 
is damaged during the lease period, the resulting loss would be vested on the bank.225 
This mode unlike Mudaraba and Musharaka has low costs of loan administration 
and monitoring because of its simple repayment schedule that allows for flexibility.226 This 
could be instrumental to helping farmers access credit in Uganda. For example, if a farmer 
is in need of initial physical capital like a tractor or any equipment, the Islamic financial 
institution can buy the equipment and lease them to the client.227 If the farmer however 
wishes to buy the equipment, the bank sells it to them at a markup price.228 The farmer 
(client) pays back the price in agreed upon installments in the future.229  
 From analyzing all these modes of Islamic finance, it is seen that the capital structure 
of Islamic banks as seen above comprises of substantial portion of equity participation with 
comparatively higher equity to asset ratio. This trait renders Islamic finance with a superior 
stability position than its conventional counterparts.230 The same reasons have been 
advanced for Islamic finance’s resilience in the midst of the 2008 global financial crisis.231 
This would therefore be important for Uganda whose banking sector has been characterized 
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3.2.3. Islamic windows 
Under section 115 A (1 to 3) of the FIA 2016, a financial institution carrying on 
business, may apply to the Central Bank to carry on Islamic financial business in addition to 
its existing licensed business through an Islamic window. This means the part of a financial 
institution, other than an Islamic financial institution, which conducts Islamic financial 
business. 
This is beneficial to Islamic finance because Islamic banking services 
benefit/freeload from the structures and network that conventional banks have already 
established without having to start from scratch. This would subsequently improve the 
quality of services and lower their cost, which could improve intermediation between the 
two.232 As seen in chapter 2, one of the key challenges faced by government in deepening 
financial inclusion is the high cost of accessing credit.233 Therefore the lowering of costs 
that come with the Islamic banking windows could help alleviate this challenge. Windows 
also do this by increasing competition in the market, which could reduce the cost of credit 
access for Shar’iah-compliant products.234 
Further, Islamic banking windows facilitate liquidity management, especially in 
countries where Islamic liquidity instruments are finite.235 Windows usually have easy 
access to liquidity support from the conventional part of the bank. This could assist in 
stabilizing the banking sector which as seen in chapter 2 under challenges hindering 
financial inclusion, is growing concern.236 In addition for countries with small demand for 
Islamic banking services especially those with a low Muslim population, (like Uganda237) 
the window could be the only feasible way of providing Islamic Banking services, thus 
increasing financial inclusion.238 
                                                          
232 Inwon Song and Carel Ousthuizen, “Islamic Banking Regulation and Supervision; Survey results and 
challenges,” IMF Working Paper 14/220 (Washington: International Monetary Fund 2014). 
233Uganda ranks in the 120th position out of 138 states in affordability of financial services. The Economic 
Forum Global Competitiveness Report (2016-2017) 
234 Inwon Song, op cit (n232). 
235 ibid. 
236 The third biggest bank in Uganda, Crane Bank was according to the Central Bank shut down because it was 
under-capitalized and that had posed systemic risk to the banking sector. See Governor Bank Of Uganda Press 
release available at https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/bou-downloads/press_releases/2016/Oct/PRESS-RELEASE-
Crane-Bank-Oct-20-2016.pdf last accessed on July 12, 2017.  
237 According to the 2014 census, 14 percent of the population adhered to Islam. 




In conclusion, as discussed above, Islamic finance emphasizes trade in assets more 
than it does in financing consequently facilitating trade by assisting business people get the 
usufructs of assets which they could not have owned by themselves hence inducing a 
productive inclusive economy. Therefore, for this to work out properly there needs to be a 
well-founded regulatory and supervisory structure that not only heed to Shar’iah law of 





















4. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK AND CHALLENGES OF ISLAMIC BANKING 
IN UGANDA 
4.1. Institutional Framework and Supervisory Bodies 
The Bank of Uganda 
The principle regulatory and supervisory organ in Uganda is the Bank of Uganda 
(BoU) which is the Central Bank.239 It is established under Bank of Uganda Act 1966 which 
now operationalizes Article 161 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 (as 
amended). In general terms, the functions of BoU are to formulate and implement monetary 
policy directed to economic objectives of achieving and maintaining economic stability.240  
Furthermore, BoU’s functionality extends to development financing with a mandate of 
refinancing facilities to financial institutions; management of loans and grants for 
development projects through commercial banks; and closely supervising the outcome of 
the funds dispersed to commercial banks.241 
With the introduction of Islamic Finance concept, under the new FIA 2016, there is 
to be established a Central Shari’ah Advisory Council in the Bank of Uganda. 242 Its 
mandate is to advise the Central Bank on matters of regulations and supervision of Islamic 
banking systems in the country as well as approving any product to be offered by financial 
institutions conducting Islamic banking.243 
Further, the legal framework of BoU also defines its interaction with financial 
institutions.244 In order to foster institutional harmony between the regulator and the banks, 
the BoU is given the mandate to cooperate with the financial institutions in order to promote 
and maintain adequate and reasonable banking services for the public; ensure high standards 
of conduct and management throughout the banking system; promote such policies not 
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being inconsistent with any provision of the BoU Act; provide facilities for the clearing of 
financial instruments for financial institutions generally on terms determined by it.245 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
This is another supervisory authority Ugandan banks rely on. The BCBS sets 
guidelines for global regulation of banks. It is the media for agreeing international 
regulation on the conduct of banking which constitute an accord.246 The Basel Accord is a 
series of agreements set by the BCBS to provide guidelines and recommendations on 
banking regulation in order to minimize risks inherent within the financial sector.247 
Although not a compulsory directive to nations, the BoU has occasionally adopted some of 
these guidelines as mandatory standards with which domestic banks must comply. In 2009, 
Uganda joined the Basel III framework with other countries expecting to build a banking 
sector that can withstand shocks that impacted the global banking system during the 2008 
financial crisis.248 This was to be achieved through requiring banks to hold capital buffers of 
a minimum of UGX 25 billion and for bigger banks to even have more. This has been 
enforced by Uganda as seen in The Financial Institutions (Revision of Minimum Capital 
Requirements) Instrument No. 43 of 2010 in accordance with section 26(5) of the Financial 
Institutions Act 2004, revised the Minimum Capital Requirements of Commercial Banks. 
Further in line with the Basel III reforms, the BoU in December 2016 raised the minimum 
statutory capital adequacy ratios to 10 percent (up from 8 percent) of the risk-weighted 
assets of the bank on top of holding a capital conservation buffer of 2.5 percent of their risk-
weighted assets.249 
The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) 
This is an Islam specialized international standard-setting organization. It promotes 
stability of the Islamic banking sector by issuing international prudential standards and 
guiding principles for the sector, generally defined to include banking, capital markets and 
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insurance sectors. 250It researches and coordinates initiatives on Islamic finance related 
issues and organizes seminars and conferences for regulators and industry stakeholders.251 
Unlike the BCBS which relies on regulatory frameworks and best practices developed by 
leading banks as a background to its global framework; the IFSB has the task of developing 
on its own mind, the framework specifically for Islamic banks.252  
The Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI)  
This is an Islamic international autonomous non-profit corporate body that 
determines accounting, auditing, governance, ethics and Shari’ah Standards for Islamic 
Financial Institutions. Its mandate is to develop accounting and auditing principles relevant 
to Islamic finance, disseminate the said developed principles through training, seminars, 
publication as well as reviewing and amending accounting and auditing standards for 
Islamic financial institutions. All these objectives are carried out in conformity with the 
precepts of Islamic Shari’ah.253 
4.2. Legislative Challenges For Islamic Bank In Uganda 
Islamic finance is alien to Ugandan laws and it is only one Act that specifically 
provides for it albeit deficiently. Prudential regulation of banks is as imperative and required 
in Islamic banking as it is in conventional banking.254 The risks of Islamic banking are 
fundamentally related to financial intermediation. 255 Subsequently, the objectives of 
prudential regulation and supervision to Islamic banking are similar to those of conventional 
banks: namely to pursue and maintain financial stability and avoid distress by ensuring the 
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safety and soundness of banks, thereby preventing problems from having systemic 
consequences.256 
As earlier discussed, public confidence in banks wanes when there is distress in the 
banking sector and this in turn is detrimental to both financial stability and inclusion. Thus it 
is paramount that the regulatory framework for Islamic banking should be fashioned to 
avoid undermining the stability of the financial system. Key elements to achieve this 
objective include: i) understanding the nature of Islamic banking activities, ii) making 
appropriate changes to the existing regulatory framework for Islamic banking, and iii) 
leveling the playing field  between Islamic banking and conventional banking.257 
The regulatory challenges wedged against Islamic finance’s pursuit for financial inclusion 
and economic stability are as follows: 
4.2.1. The Financial Institutions Amendment Act 2016  
This specifically provides for and has encapsulated principles related to Islamic 
finance into the banking sector regulatory framework. It provides for the requirements 
needed to acquire a license before operating as a financial institution, the liquidity 
maintenance ratios, and limitations on some transactions a bank cannot engage in. It also 
establishes the Credit Reference Bureau and reforms the Deposit Protection Fund. This 
section analyses whether this piece of legislation and its regulations enable Islamic banking 
foster economic stability and inclusive growth.   
Eligibility to acquire licence 
Section 4(1) of the FIA provides that a person shall not transact any deposit-taking 
or other financial institution business in Uganda without a valid licence granted for that 
purpose under the Act and section 115A(1) states that a financial institution in Uganda may 
not operate as an Islamic bank without acquiring license from BoU. 
Section 4(2) of the FIA states that no person shall be granted a licence to transact business 
as a financial institution unless it is a company within the meaning of the Act. Also Section 
1 of the FIA, 2016 defines an Islamic financial institution as a company licensed to carry on 
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financial institution business in Uganda whose entire business comprises Islamic financial 
business and which has declared to the Central Bank that its entire operations are and will be 
conducted in accordance with the Shari’ah. 
The implication of this definition is that an Islamic bank can only be eligible to 
acquire license to operate as a financial institution only if it is a company. This presents a 
challenge since the concept of a corporate personality258 is not acceptable in Islamic 
Shari’ah.259 The rationale as to why there is no corporation in Islam is that, it is natural 
persons who have connection and thus are answerable to God for their deeds.260 While 
contemporary corporate law theory postulates that a company has an artificial personality 
responsible for its own deeds261 this theoretical constructs on responsibility of a company is 
antithetical to Islamic philosophy as the company has no faculty of mind as an individual 
person.262 This non-physical existence is reechoed in the famous oft-quoted words attributed 
to Lord Chancellor Baron Thurlow in the late eighteenth century that , “a company has no 
soul to damn and no body to kick”.263  
However, in critique, the proponents of this line of thought are misguided. If a 
company wrongs someone, the veil of incorporation can be lifted to hold its controllers 
answerable/accountable. This principle of veil lifting states that although the corporate 
personality of a company is sacrosanct, it can nonetheless be lifted if it has been grossly 
abused.264 Therefore this should not be held as a hindrance but it nonetheless is by some 
people.  
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Maintenance of liquid assets ratios 
Liquidity refers to the degree of flexibility that an asset can be converted into cash 
quickly and easily without affecting the asset’s value.265 It is the ability to sell an asset and 
convert it into cash, at a price equal or close to its true value, in a short period of time; the 
‘moneyness’ of an asset.266 Section 28 (1) of FIA provides that a financial institution shall 
maintain a minimum holding of liquid assets, as determined by the Central Bank. This 
section makes it mandatory that all banks including Islamic banks should maintain liquid 
assets at levels which the BoU prescribes indiscriminately. 
Islamic Shari’ah prohibits dealing in most of liquid assets and therefore a significant 
number of Islamic bank’s assets are kept in the form of illiquid assets.267 The most liquid of 
assets is money and Islamic Banks as seen in the previous chapter do not deal with money 
but with assets which is the very fabric of Islamic Financing.268 These liquid assets yield 
returns in the form of interest (riba) which is in direct contravention with the Shari’ah 
law.269 There is no objection to investing in liquid assets however, the returns earned on 
these liquid assets should be in conformity with the Shari’ah which is not possible under 
this Act’s operation. 
Banks Liquidity Measuring and Monitoring 
Further, when it comes to measuring and monitoring liquidity of banks- a function 
governed by the Financial Institutions (Liquidity) Regulations, 2005- the fact that Islamic 
banks cannot be as liquid as conventional banking is not considered. This is because while 
the latter deals mainly in cash, the former mainly deal with assets as discussed in the 
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previous chapter. Assets are less liquid compared to cash.270 The effect of this regulation is 
like the effect of Section 28 (1) of FIA as has been discussed above.  
Deposit Protection Fund 
Section 108(1) of the FIA establishes the Deposit Protection Fund which is 
controlled and managed by the Central Bank.271 Monies paid into the Deposit Protection 
Fund are contributed by banks in order to secure their customers in case those banks are 
distressed and fail consequently being resolved.272 When this occurs, the Fund pays back to 
the bank an amount which is higher than that which had been earlier on contributed by the 
banks as a result of interest. This is seen under section 108(6) of the FIA which provides 
that money constituting the Fund shall be placed in an account with the Central Bank to be 
invested in such manner as it deems appropriate and any income from the investment shall 
be credited to the Fund. 
These sections present a problem since deposit insurance involves the exchange of money 
for money and the exchange occurs on an interest-based transaction and therefore contrary 
to Islamic values.273 The interest element could also exist if the Protection Fund monies are 
invested in interest-based transactions or other ventures considered immoral and not 
approved by Islamic Shariah thus haram.274 The profit would be viewed as not permissible 
and thus tainted in sin to be applied in refunding an Islamic bank when it has closed.275  
 
Risk Management through Credit Reference Bureaus. 
The FIA 2016 also introduces the Credit Reference Bureaus concept under sections 
26, 78A which make it mandatory for banks to conduct credit checks on all customers 
applying to them for credit. It also mandates banks under section 78 (2)(a) to report to the 
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Credit Reference Bureau all Non-Performing Loans classified as doubtful or loss in their 
portfolio. 
This is meant to provide prudential guidance to banks on whether an applicant has in the 
past failed in his obligation to pay and is otherwise un-creditworthy. This compulsory 
procedure impairs the Islamic banks from disbursing credit even though as seen in the 
previous chapter, creditworthiness is not significant requirement for one to access credit in 
Islamic finance. 
This is because although an applicant may not be creditworthy and with no property to use 
as collateral security, if their proposed project is economically promising they may succeed 
in securing a loan from an Islamic bank yet fail to secure an ordinary bank loan for their 
project. This would promote deeper financial inclusion status in Uganda and ease access to 
credit and encourage productivity and real economic activity. This requirement does not 
capture the primary expectations of Islamic banking in the loan client since the Islamic bank 
does business in a partnership with a client it is not much interested in the latter’s 
creditworthy but rather whether their proposed venture has high prospects of success. 
 
Limitation to invest on equity and assets 
Directives on this aspect are obtained from The Financial Institutions (Limits on 
Credit Concentration and Large Exposures) Regulations, 2005. The main objective of these 
Regulations, among others, is to prescribe limits for investment in equity and fixed assets.276 
Investment and trade in assets and equities in Islamic banking cannot be separated as has 
been discussed throughout the paper. Assets are a critical and underlying basis for any 
Islamic banking business and money in Islamic banking is inferior to property; as such these 
limitations curtail its effective operation.277  
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The BoU as lender of last resort 
Like most, the BoU being a central bank, serves as banker and lender of last resort to 
commercial banks in times of liquidity crunches.278 This financing is done through the 
Lombard window facility at BoU.279 Lombard credit refers to granting of credit to banks by 
Central Banks against pledged collateral such as securities or insurance policies.280 The 
eligible collateral for borrowing BoU lending includes Government securities, corporate 
bonds, promissory notes and Bills of exchange, reserves with BoU, Cash assets warehouse 
warrants, balances with banks abroad, bank loans, fixed assets, and income producing and 
cash flow positive real estate.281 
Although the BoU supervises Islamic banks, Islamic banks cannot benefit from these loans 
as they are provided on the basis of interest that comes with repurchase agreements (the 
repo rate).282 Since Islamic finance is anti riba/interest, then it is left out and thus when in 
distress, there may not be any saving grace for them under this system.283 
Issues with Islamic Windows 
There can be a few risks and challenges that are associated with Islamic banking 
windows. The mixing of Islamic windows’ assets and liabilities with conventional banks 
could have consequential reputational risk, as depositors in windows might suddenly 
withdraw their money if rumors regarding commingling arise.284 This also raises concerns 
about consumer protection which may in turn lower client confidence in these banks which 
hurts financial inclusion as seen in chapter 2. 
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Furthermore, the Islamic windows could hinder the establishment of effective 
corporate governance and risk management systems because the management and board of a 
conventional bank may not be comprehensively acquainted with the peculiar risks 
associated with Islamic finance activities.285 Therefore, their ability to comprehend risks 
inherent with Islamic finance and supervise the risk management of the Islamic Banking 
window may be undermined.  
There have been attempts at alleviating the above challenge through establishment of 
Shar’iah boards under section 115B of the FIA Act. However even these boards might not 
be able to verify the complete separation of assets and liabilities of the two respective types 
of banks’ accounts. 
The use of Islamic windows could further lead to regulatory arbitrage or unjust 
practices. For instance, by nature of the PLS concept of Islamic banking accounts, risky 
financing could be promoted to acquire Islamic financing through windows because, in the 
case of default, the account holders of Islamic windows will bear the losses.286 Likewise, 
securities holdings could be shifted between investment portfolios funded by conventional 
sources of funds and those financed by Islamic accounts for ease of returns.287 
The Islamic windows could further obstruct effective financial oversight.288 This is 
because some prudential ratios that might vary for Islamic banking could be strenuous to 
monitor properly. Windows could also impede the preparation of proper financial statements 
for windows activities, thus obstructing effective oversight. 
Further because of the commingling, there may be difficulty in resolution or rescue 
when a bank is in distress. This is because the issue of how distressed Islamic banks should 
be resolved in accordance with Shar’iah principles is still under deliberation and there has 
been no conclusive position to this effect.289 Consequently, it is submitted that if authorities 
are faced with a distressed conventional bank with an Islamic window, there may be 
difficulty in conducting an effective resolution or rescue in line with financial stability 
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objectives and Shar’iah law that could potentially alter the treatment of the Islamic banking 
window.  
Therefore, Islamic finance’s coexistence with conventional banking in the same 
institution could as seen either bring about stability and enhance financial inclusion or it 
could wreak havoc if not well regulated.  
4.2.2. The Legal Concept of goods 
As seen, provision of finances to clients by Islamic banks is largely based on the sale 
of goods to clients on credit. For example under the Murabaha mode of finance, the bank 
procures goods or services and resells it to the client at a profit. The only laws that are 
greatly useful in Islamic banking in relation to goods are the Sale of Goods Act, Cap 82 and 
the Contracts Act 2010. 
A few challenges, however, against these laws are: Section 1(h) of the Sale of Goods Act 
defines goods as all chattels personal excluding things in action and money, emblements, 
industrial growing crops, and things attached to or forming part of the land, which are 
agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale and by this a contract of sale 
involving the things excluded is not acceptable. This definition is pari materia with the 
definition of goods under the Contract Act.290  
In Islamic banking, the ‘bai salam’ mode of financing is mainly used for sales of 
goods such as crops which have not been planted or harvested from the farm. Such is not 
recognised as goods that can be sold under the Sale of Goods Act and Contract Act.291 
Under ‘bai salam’ the fact that one can sell crops even before he has planted them is not 
possible under Uganda’s contract law regime. Under section 23 of the Contract Act, an 
agreement on this kind of transaction is void for uncertainty.  
Further, under Section 28 of the same law, it is referred to as a contingent contract and is 
unenforceable. A contingent contract is a contract to do or not to do something, where an 
event, collateral to such contract, does or does not happen.292 For instance, under Islamic 
law a farmer may receive funds from an Islamic bank to cultivate crops and in turn sale the 
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harvest and pay the bank its due. This fact makes the contract contingent upon availability 
of such crops which is uncertain and thus unenforceable. 
4.2.3. Double taxation with respect to sales modes transactions 
The emergence of Islamic finance raises issues relating to payment of stamp duty 
fee. The fee is pertinent to the value of real property or a financial agreement and is mostly 
charged as a standard part of conventional commercial banking and in business practice.293 
Section 2 of the Stamps Act, Cap 342 provides that every instrument mentioned in the Act’s 
schedule is executed in Uganda or if executed outside Uganda, relates to any property in 
Uganda or to any matter to be performed shall be chargeable with the duty of the amount 
indicated in that schedule in relation to such instrument. 
The challenge arises in purchase and resale agreements associated with some Islamic 
financing. Usually stamp duty is paid when the ownership in the asset is transferred.294 So 
the buyer must pay this over and above the purchase price paid to the seller. With Islamic 
sales, however, the bank buys the property instead and then resells it to the client with an 
appropriate mark-up.295 The taxation problem is; these two transactions would normally 
incur two separate stamp duty payments.296 What is disregarded is that this is only one 
financing arrangement but that two transactions are needed to achieve the desired outcome. 
Thus while the interest a conventional bank receives is regarded as a ‘passive’ income, 
profit received by Islamic bank is regarded as an earned income which is treated differently 
for purposes of tax hence paying twice.297 
In addition, in trade financing there are title transfers twice, once from seller to bank and 
then from bank to buyer and therefore both these transactions are twice taxed. This increases 
the cost and thence decreases the profitability of the venture.298  
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4.2.4. Jurisdiction of the Court in Uganda in Islamic banks disputes 
Article 138 of the Ugandan Constitution states that there shall be a High court of 
Uganda and article 139 provides this court with original and unlimited jurisdiction.299 The 
High Court has divisions among which is the commercial division. This handles matters of a 
commercial nature such as companies and banks.300 Regulation 4(1) of the Constitution 
(Commercial Court) (Practice)(Directions) S-1 Constitutional 6 states that the business of 
the commercial court shall comprise of all actions arising out of any relationship of a 
commercial or business nature including banking. As Islamic banks disputes fall under the 
same purview, all disputes arising out of Islamic bank transactions will be subject to the 
same procedure and process as experienced by its conventional counterpart. This can lead to 
ill delivered judgments since Islamic banking has some technical aspects different from 
those of the conventional one. These require judicial officers to be well versed with them 
before forming an informed decision. However Islamic banking being a new phenomenon in 
Uganda, it is highly unlikely that the judges are well acquainted with its legal aspects. 
Therefore given its technical difference from conventional banking, Islamic finance 
should adopt tried and tested framework for execution of commercial and financial contracts 
and transactions as used in other countries where it has registered remarkable success. It is 
necessary that the available laws be amended and new ones introduced on top of other 
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5. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION;  
5.1. Lessons from Malaysia. 
The Ernst and Young World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2016 ranks 
Malaysia as a leading Islamic finance powerhouse globally.301 Islamic finance has been a 
priority area in Malaysia for three decades with promulgation of Islamic fitting laws. In 
2013, it enacted a comprehensive Islamic Financial Services Act to consolidate Islamic 
financial sector regulations, improving Sharī‘ah governance, properly differentiate Islamic 
deposit taking from investment activities, and provide relevant regulations for both.302 These 
efforts foster proper risk sharing between the financial institutions and their clients. The Act 
further graces the responsibility of overall supervision with the Central Bank of Malaysia; 
the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM).303 The BNM was established under the Central Bank of 
Malaysia Act 1958 which is currently amended by the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 
2009.304 Lessons and recommendations to take away from their banking law regime in aid 
of a young Ugandan Islamic law banking sector include the following. 
5.1.1. Liquidity Measurement Adjustments  
From the aforementioned challenges, a pattern can be seen throughout the 
regulations and guidelines and that is, most regulations that are currently being used by the 
BoU in supervising banks are not appropriate for Islamic banking. This is because Islamic 
banking has new technicalities different from those of the conventional banks.  
For instance, the challenges relating to liquidity requirements and adequacy of capital in 
banks depend on an assessment of the value of assets of the individual banks.305 Since there 
is variation in assets held by the different types of banks due to their modus operandi, then 
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money market and Islamic foreign exchange market to promote financial stability and compliance with 
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303 Section 6 
304Section 3 of Act 701, Laws of Malaysia whose long title states that, “An Act to provide for the continued 
existence of the Central Bank of Malaysia and for the administration, objects, functions and powers of the 
Bank, for consequential or incidental matters”.  




applying the one-size-fits-all approach will yield discriminate results as the considered 
percentage of risk weighted assets (RWAs) may also be different.306  
In Uganda as seen above, the BCBS capital framework applies to all banks as there 
is no distinction between the capital requirements that apply to Islamic financial institutions 
and those that regulate the conventional ones. This is not the case in Malaysia which pursues 
the mixed approach where a similar regulatory framework is adopted for areas that are 
applicable to Islamic and conventional banks, but separate guidelines and regulations are 
issued for areas that are specific to Islamic banking.307 That is, in Malaysia, the BCBS 
capital framework is complemented by the guidelines of the IFSB, custom made for Islamic 
banking. Following the revamping of the Basel Capital Accord in 2005, the IFSB issued two 
regulatory standards on capital adequacy and risk management for Islamic institutions.308 
Therein, IFSB supervisory discretionary formula was proposed for Capital Adequacy Ratio 
(CAR) and can be expressed as;309  
 
“CAR= [Eligible Capital]/{[total risk-weighted assets + operational risk]-[RWAs 
funded by restricted profit sharing investment accounts (credit + market risk) – [(1- 
α*) total risk-weighted assets funded by unrestricted profit sharing investment 
accounts] – [ α* risk-weighted assets funded by Profit Equalization Reserves and 
Investment Risk Reserves of unrestricted profit sharing investment accounts]}, where 
α*is the proportion of assets funded by Profit Sharing Investment Accounts and is 
determined by the supervisory authorities”310 
 
                                                          
306 Risk-weighted asset is a bank's assets or off-balance-sheet exposures, weighted according to risk. This sort 
of asset calculation is used in determining the capital requirement or Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) for a 
financial institution. Under Basel III, banks should hold enough capital to equal at least 8% of risk-weighted 
assets.  
307 Inwon Song, op cit (n232) 
308 See the IFSB’s guidelines “Capital Adequacy Standards for Institutions (Other than Insurance Institutions) 
Offering Only Islamic Financial Services” and “Guiding Principles of Risk Management for Institutions (Other 
than Insurance Institutions) Offering Only Islamic Financial Services”. 
309 Inwon Song, op cit (n232) 
310 IFSB issued in March 2011, a guidance note with a methodology to estimate the value of alpha to be used 




Therefore although discretionary, the BoU is advised to adopt this same formula for Islamic 
banks in relation to liquidity measurements for a fair criteria that fosters Islamic banking 
growth. 
5.1.2. Application of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
For an expedient and efficient supporting Islamic legal system, there is need to train 
judicial officers, lawyers and other officers of court about the intricacies of Islamic law. 
However, in the meantime, it is crucial to use Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in 
solving any dispute which emerged from the Islamic banks in Uganda.  
ADR firstly is a highly encouraged practice in Islam311 and has been practiced since the 
advent of Shari’ah law over fourteen centuries ago.312 Another reason why ADR is a 
suitable mechanism is that through the mediation and arbitration modes, the parties can 
employ an Islamic bank expert to facilitate their resolve or arbitration. This would overcome 
the challenge arising from the lack of acquainted personnel in the courts of law.  
Further, this mode is beneficial to both parties to the dispute as it may save time wasted in 
court litigating and also can foster confidentiality if the would be litigants do not wish to 
wash their linen in public. 
In Malaysia, ADR is prevalent and the Central Bank’s Shari’ah board has overall 
authority over Shari’ah issues arising out of banking and finance as the final arbiter in 
disputes on such issues.313 Section 51 of the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 establishes 
a Shari’ah Advisory Council and its ruling is not only binding but can be used as precedence 
by courts of law.314 
The same is recommended for Uganda. This would bequeath the BoU Shari’ah advisory 
board legislative and adjudicative powers ensure quick, proper and informed decision 
making. If the members of BoU Shari’ah Board make good decisions, this could also create 
                                                          
311 The Quran at Surah 4, verse 35, “If you fear a breach between them twain (the man and his wife), appoint 
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their reconciliation. Indeed Allah is Ever All-Knower, Well-Acquainted with all things.” 
312 Blazing The Trail: The Institutional Framework for Dispute Resolution in Malaysia’s Islamic Finance 
Industry Umar A. Oseni and Abu Umar Faruq Ahmad. 
313Section 57 of the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009.  




a wealth of Islamic finance jurisprudence for the court's guidance through this new nascent 
phenomenon. 
5.1.3. Exemption from Double Taxation  
To remove tax discrimination between the application of conventional instruments 
and Islamic instruments, Malaysia made different amendments to its legislation regarding 
tax treatment of Islamic finance. 
Under amendments to the Malaysian Income Tax Act 1967, Section 2(8) provided that  
“…any reference in this Act to the disposal of an asset or lease by or to a person 
pursuant to a scheme of financing approved by the Central Bank…as a scheme in 
accordance with the principles of Shari’ah where such disposal is strictly required 
for the purpose of complying with those principles but which will not be required in 
any other schemes of financing”.  
This implied that the Act allowed Islamic financing to continue without any tax issues 
relating to asset transfer or lease whilst though not evading taxes.315  
 
Further the Malaysian Stamp Act 1949 has been amended by a variety of exemption 
orders for different transactions. These exempted from stamp duty on all instruments of 
Ijara lease agreement of immovable property executed between a client and a bank pursuant 
to the Ijara term financing facility;316 instruments of asset sale agreements between client 
and bank made under principles of Shari’ah for the purpose of renewing any Islamic 
overdraft financing facility;317 and like instruments that related to purchase of property for 
the purpose of lease back under Shari’ah principles.318   
As analyzed in the previous chapter, Uganda’s tax regime if not amended will chock Islamic 
banking growth at the incipient stage. There is thus urgent need for modification of the tax 
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316 Stamp Duty (Exemption) (No.8) Order 2000 
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laws to exempt the Islamic banks from double taxation on assets they acquire for financing 
purposes.319  
5.1.4. Separate Deposit Protection Fund 
Malaysia has implemented a binary deposit insurance system following the 
September 2005 enactment of the Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation Act (MDIC 
Act)320. Malaysia’s Islamic deposit insurance system operates separately from the 
conventional system, but both systems are administered solely by the Malaysia Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (MDIC).321 
This makes it easy to determine which money belongs to either bank and as such, money 
can be invested in Shari´ah compliant liquid assets until they are required.322 
Therefore in times of distress, the money appropriated for Islamic banks in the deposit 
protection fund can be used to revive a distressed Islam financial institution and nurse it 
back to normal health as a going concern 
There is a need for creating other forms of returns to the BoU so that Islamic banks can 
benefit from loans granted by the Central Bank when in danger. The importance of this 
cannot be understated. In his text, “Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market” 
(1873), Walter Bagehot postulates that unlike commercial banks, the role of the Central 
Bank is peculiar because it is the holder of liquid reserves. Therefore, when commercial 
banks encounter illiquidity or financial distress, the Central Bank has the capacity and duty 
to lend the commercial banks to satisfy liquidity demands. If BoU keeps a separate Fund 
that is interest free then in times of need, it can lend to the Islamic bank. 
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320 Now amended and cited as ‘Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act 2015’. 
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Insurance Corporation" with perpetual succession and a common seal, and which may sue and be sued in its 
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322Mzee, Mzee Mustafa. "The Legislative Challenges of Islamic Banking in Tanzania." JL Pol'y & 




5.1.5. Twin Peaks model of financial regulation. 
Lastly is a proposal not from the Malaysian context but one the author is inclined to 
recommend as necessary for economic stability and successful supervision of Islamic 
finance and Uganda’s banking sector at large. This is based on the findings made throughout 
this paper and mainly those of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry instituted in January 
October 2000 to investigate the cause of the frequent collapse of banks. The commission 
chaired by Justice James Ogoola upon concluding its investigation found that weak 
supervision by the BOU was a major cause of these bank failures.323 There had been laxity 
in decision making and the bank had not actively used its intervention powers at the early 
detection of distress by banks which was reiterated by the IMF.324 
In light of this, the ‘Twin Peaks Model of financial regulation’ is recommended. This mode 
of financial regulation calls for the separation of the financial stability role to be 
administered by a one department and the supervision of banking practice and consumer 
protection mandate to be exercised by another department/regulator.325 The first peak, the 
Financial Stability Commission, would ensure that there are adequate and sufficient 
prudential measures to ensure soundness of the financial system, capital adequacy of banks 
and control of risk. The second peak, the Consumer Protection Commission, would enforce 
business conduct regulations to ensure that customers received a fair, honest and transparent 
service.326 This model has been applied by Australia, Netherlands, the UK and its off-shoots 
can be found in South Africa,327 Spain and Canada.328 
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325 Michael Taylor, “Twin Peaks: A Regulatory Structure for the New Century”. Issue 20 of Centre for Study 
of Financial Innovation Series, 1995. 
326 Ibid  
327 Under the newly promulgated Financial Services Regulation Act, 2017. 
328 For a general discussion on Twin Peaks model and the various regulatory systems see Richard J. Herring & 
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The introduction of Islamic finance in Uganda has widened the scope of financial 
industry and as such silo regulation has become untenable.329  A proposal for a twin peak 
system in Uganda is essential especially in the wake of the BoU’s struggles with supervising 
national banks.330 This would help reduce the load of responsibility the BoU has and instead 
of focusing on the whole economy, direct its attention on prudent supervision of Islamic 
banks and the sector at large. 
 
5.2. Conclusion: Uganda, An Aspiring Dual System. 
In a nutshell, while Islamic banking and finance is expected to remarkably contribute 
to inclusive economic growth and development in Uganda, it remains an emerging field in 
the financial system. Therefore, all stakeholders must first clearly acquaint themselves with 
the intricacies of Islamic finance modes; apprehend its unique tenets that distinguish it from 
conventional banking while also acknowledging the similarities between the two models. 
This will significantly contribute to the effective rollout and growth of the Islamic banking 
sector in Uganda. 
First and foremost, before guidance is issued on the regulatory nature of Islamic 
banking, care should be made to exercise proper corporate governance by the individual 
institutions. This is for two main reasons; one is the significant inherent opacity of the 
balance sheet of banks which makes it hard to assess the quality of the assets that a bank 
holds and subsequently its true financial position.331 Secondly, the potential ripple effects of 
bank failures are very disastrous to the country’s economy as was clearly exhibited by the 
                                                          
329Silo regulation means a regulatory framework based on supervision and regulation of according to 
industries, such as separate regulators for banking, insurance, securities and pensions. This differs from Twin 
Peaks in the sense that the peaks model regulates according to function, such as consumer treatment and 
systemic risk management. Silver Kayondo, “Legal aspects of distressed bank rescue: Lessons for Uganda 
from the South African and English experience” dissertation presented in fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of Master of Laws (Banking and Finance) at the University of Pretoria. Page 59 
330 During the closure of Crane Bank, the BoU Governor admitted that they discovered “too late” that the bank 
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‘Museveni okayed Crane Bank closure- Mutebile’ The Daily Monitor available at 
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global financial crisis in 2007/8. Plus it should be remembered that no amount of legislative 
regulation can save a bank whose owners run it poorly. 
On the regulatory front, financial inclusion by Islamic finance is likely to be 
hampered by the lack of a harmonized financial regulation structure. As discussed before, 
discriminate policies in taxation, liquidity measurements and standards, and limitations to 
invest in equity and assets constitute a major challenge for the Islamic finance industry. 
They constrain it in its efforts to provide credit and improve financial inclusion and develop 
the economy at large. 
Globally accepted prudential standards passed by the IFSB that smoothly blend Islamic 
finance with the conventional financial system need to be adopted by the BoU. For example, 
the adoption of the IFSB Standards (somewhat akin to Basel III) which take into account the 
specificities of Islamic finance, secure a level playing field between the two types of banks. 
In addition to micro- prudential regulation, there is call for the two peak system. This 
model has been applied by Australia, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and under is under 
debate in South Africa,332 Spain and Canada.333 The focus on macro-prudential policy is 
inspired by the fact that micro-prudential regulation although essential, it is not a 
comprehensive deterrent to systemic risk.334 Micro-prudential regulation (such as the Basel I 
and II capital accords) tends to view financial institutions in isolation and aims mainly to 
ensure that each is individually solvent.335 
From the aforementioned, one thing is clear and that is all stakeholders, from the customers 
to the banks and regulatory authorities, there must be joint effort in kick starting Islamic 
Banking especially at this incipient stage. As discussed, because of its interest-free nature 
among other qualities, it has the potential to lower the cost of accessing credit which is a 
major challenge to financial inclusion. 
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